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871 Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine
626 during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

665 In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

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The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs 665
of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained 563
by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly 178
peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on 665
these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial 178
speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central 191
Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

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● 665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

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731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

● 665 661 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that ‘the social revolution 000
begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the
following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It
did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.’ Just for this
reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to
a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples
of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the 565
years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that 665
the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable 661
adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was 185
therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in
recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet
ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for
mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the
support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

‘The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated
industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance
with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of
agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic
reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had
been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. 423
The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to 661
a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this 565
case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely 474
ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were
unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their 668
risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants
chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found
expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and
unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*).
As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural
reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful
famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the
percentage of collectivized farms was greatest’ (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 ● 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

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larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd
642 declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the
665 Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew
rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro-
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian [728]
Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned 648
that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great 186
efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a 642
national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class 665
lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Direc- 648
tory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situa- 642
tion, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 665 ●
Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian intellectuals at a crucial moment. 186

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prom- 648
inence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles 186
for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were 642
patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satis-
186 fied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt
642 able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population com-
665 pletely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their 642
own territory. 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the 665 Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states.

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

[1] [sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on -- Analyst]

665 affirmative triumphed, and the Borotbisty were dissolved as a separate group. They were given the nominal right of choosing two members for the Executive Committee of the KP/b/U but this was, of course, an empty phrase, since that Executive Committee was itself but an agent and tool of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Ukapisty offered a more serious threat, for they were trained in Marxian dialectics and they knew the weak points in the program of the Moscow centre. They accepted the Marxian analysis of capitalist society and the Leninist theory of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet regime. As regards the question of nationality, they shared the Marxist-Leninist conception but in contrast to the Russian Communist Party they [186] adapted this to suit a non-ruling and enslaved nation. The Ukapisty[1] theoretically based the difference between its attitude and that of the Russian Communist Party on the fact that the latter represented the proletariat of a dominant nation, while they stood for the proletariat of an enslaved nation. Thus the one considered the question of nationality as a question of tactics connected with the spreading of the proletarian revolution; for the other it was a question of program connected with the liberation of the people and itself not only from capitalistic but also from national enslavement. They condemned the Russian Bolshevik practices in Ukraine and, in contrast to the Bolshevik idea of spreading the revolution by armed force (an idea which collapsed with the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 and which was then condemned by Lenin himself), they believed in the "internal forces", i.e. that the revolution would only be organic and lasting if it was carried out by the internal forces of each nation and not if it was introduced by bayonets from abroad. They stood therefore for an independent Ukrainian Soviet state, with its own red army, its own independent economy, and its entrance into the Comintern on an equal footing with all other Communist parties.

The Ukapisty were allowed to exist until 1925 and it was not until the Comintern was willing to declare that it was Muscovite to the core and that all foreign Communist parties were of right

[1] [Ukrainian Communist Party -- Analyst]

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665 rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687] members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661 attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575 it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Cooperatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic - - Analyst]

000 the coming years the form of Soviet life would steadily approach that in the Western world.

185 The same reaction was to be seen at home. Many of the more sincere and convinced Communists greatly disliked the concessions to the old order that were made at this time. It seemed to them that their revered master was turning his back upon his old position and they scoffed at the new Nepmen, who were growing wealthy under the new regime.

Lenin was not to be shaken in his policy. His motives in these concessions to capitalism are well expressed in the remarks in the *History of the All-Union Communist Party.* "Militant Communism had tried to take the fortress by frontal assault. It advanced too far and risked being cut off from its base. Lenin made the proposition to retire a few steps, to retreat for a while further to the rear, so as to pass from an assault to a siege, and then, after gaining strength, to return to the assault."

The later sequence of events showed the correctness of this explanation. The New Economic Policy in Lenin's mind was a temporary move which was made in the hope that the economic life of the country would revive. He made no lasting concessions and a careful reading of all the measures shows that they were not motivated by the sense of failure that was ascribed to them by the capitalistic world. Lenin did not put the measures in any form that would definitely bind himself or his successors. They did not provide any guarantees of their permanence, nor did they state any principle that was in contradiction with the basic philosophy of Communism. They were, obviously, a mere tactical manoeuvre in the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves.

185 The basic decree was signed in Moscow[1] and was, of course,
665 only applicable to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It could not therefore be valid without further action in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was, by hypothesis, a completely independent and sovereign state. Yet so closely knit together was the fate of the Ukrainian Communist Party with that of Russia that it was not necessary for the Ukrainian Soviet regime to issue immediately any new decree on the subject. It was automatically

[1] [New Economic Policy, March 1921 -- Analyst]

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any 185 further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling 665 any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government.

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, 423 and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. 671 Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants.

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[4] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt them-
665 selves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.

645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, 1919 --Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached
its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and
scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness
in every possible way and to establish the proper role
of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it
developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and
Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist
as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding
leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight
attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian
people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Communists, [665] ●
that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [162]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine
were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban
proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the
power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the
power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant
group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive
support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

186 skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the
191 Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the
665 language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there 186
could be little expressed opposition. 191

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or 665 ●
its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge.

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
●665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party 645
and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Com- 871
munists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian 186
Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when 665 ●
Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state.

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in [681]
many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly.

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev 645
and Kharkiv. 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Com- 186
munism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 665 ●
He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648]
which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

645 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western
871 Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the
186 Russian influence was strongest.

665 At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 631 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

● 665 642 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in 558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist ● [665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which [814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

191 Postyshev's 4/1 object was the rerussification of the country, for it 626 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news- [871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1/1 [1933 -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

● [665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939 --Analyst]

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been 474
popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, 241
it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II.

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such develop- 474
ments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the 241
permanent links which had developed to the point where they 466
threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the [423]
peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively.

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was 474
first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first 241
looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by
the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period 665
of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
● 665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller
number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately
a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred
pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average
peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he
raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his
cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his
own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satis- [665]
factory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies
at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of
the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the
entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing
whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the
factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

1/1 [Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which
626 the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

600 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 728 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

● 665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

[538] In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 665 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been expressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading 814
up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546]
when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality.
Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature 538
had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that 626
it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the 665
decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head [558]
of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

538 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures
626 of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological
665 mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois
nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814] The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language
538 and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two
626 books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
●665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668 came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

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[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

86 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

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[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

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unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

[661]
[665]
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Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

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[23] No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

[661] 517 however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

186 [563] While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 665 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob''iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

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[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

[1] [see category 116, p 14--Analyst]

with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively 186 satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of 665 an unbearably oppressive regime.[26]

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommodation 186 to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned 668* to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of [664] bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the [665] Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

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[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

6; Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part,[1] appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668*
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665●
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

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[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12-14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

[1] [of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

725 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo
665 Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of
669 Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of ~~the~~ Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

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[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

725 665 669 effort was made to give the impression that the partisans represented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

725 668* It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

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[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukrainy* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

725 668* undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

●665 668* 727 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

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[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

sistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the 665●
generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded 668*
in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another 725
Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (*Ukraïns'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia*—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.[31]

It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with 725
the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing 668*
in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.[32] Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.[33] It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is accurate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his move-

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[31] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the *founding* of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levyts'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6.

[32] Medvedev, pp. 83–86; Borovets', "Dva khresty".

[33] G. Lin'kov, *Voina v tylu vraga* (The War in the Rear of the Enemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951), p. 384.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of
Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought
heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools,
press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Soviet Union R1

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declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, 668
together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, 631
shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland".

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. *Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine*

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections u
for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elec- [666]
tions in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propa- 665
ganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections SU
showed the great difference between the political situation in Rus-
sia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship 665
(the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party.

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine*: Kharkov, 1929.

4. *The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers* u.

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers 648
was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In

148 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[165] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

● [665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186 and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668 game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162] for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[1] Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631 strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186 institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665 and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[1] [in the year 1922--Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
● 665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky
declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres *(The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan
(1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 186 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches,* vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 665 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko, the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: U 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. U 731 156

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

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Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

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*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories,
the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian
University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was
suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission
of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily
diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed
in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants
were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish
Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only
of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665] ●
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians
of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices
at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre
(UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the
leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist
Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative
societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative
movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of
Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more
than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation
(Maslosoyuz), supplied dairy products, not only for
the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries
of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants
were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 423 474 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people.[1] It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. *The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)*

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

●[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 661 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR. The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In [illegible] Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr 648 was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like [214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published [217] 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the 661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of 665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

665 661 and raise its standard and to do the same for the theater and films. He even intended to impede the sale of newspapers and books written in Russian. When the first Five Year Plan was drawn up the Ukrainian Economic Council had its own demands to make to the state planning commission. It requested the establishment of industries which should make the Ukraine economically independent of the rest of Russia, as for example, textile factories, leather factories, paper mills and chemical plants.

665 The Pan-Russian Communists had repeatedly warned of such a development. Even in 1927 when Shumskyj was transferred to the north for disciplinary reasons, the Communist Party drew up a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Comintern /116/ which, among other things, stated: "Before the Revolution we had almost no Ukrainian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the cities, now they are increasing every year, they multiply through influx from the villages, they strengthen their positions in the economy and the apparatus of government and endeavor to bring a certain proportion of Soviet officials, workers and Party members under their influence." (62) In this memorandum the great danger of nationalistic deviation within the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine)was emphatically pointed out. "The Disquieting Signal" was the title of a review of Vaganian's book On National Culture, in the official organ of the Russian government publication: The Reader and the Author. To Vaganian's warning of national cultures the government publishing firm adds the remark that there is danger in the fact that in recent times a number of Ukrainian authors have published works which the

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(62) Zaliznyak: The Struggle Between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, page 669 ff.

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism* 648 was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow. 182 As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable cir- [369] cumstances. The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances.* Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

* [During the NEP period in the Soviet Union—Analyst]

661 tion we have for many successive years carried on actions, in comparison with which the deeds of a highway robber may be called a model of honesty and humanity. I understood that the sentence of the proletarian court must be the following: to deal with me as with a mad dog, to do away with me as with a sick horse, to remove me from the social organism. The Communist Party has magnanimously accepted my penitence. The Party has given me life and the joy of work." (65)

65. The Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, pages 47 and 48.

661 •665 It was Postyshev whom Stalin sent into the Ukraine at the end of 1932 with a small army of GPU men and whom he ordered to destroy the "national counterrevolution", while Tsatonskyj and Khait were to discover, unmask and correct "national aberrations". After approximately a year's activity Postyshev reported his "successes" to the plenary meeting of the Party actives of the city of Khar'kov in November, 1933. According to this report, 27,400 of a total of 125,000 members of the KPU were expelled in 1933; 1000 nationalists were removed from the People's Commissariat for Public Education and its subordinate organizations in the province, nearly 2000 from the cooperatives and economic organizations, and approximately 300 professors and assistants from scientific institutions. 2500 Ukrainian nationalists were rounded up by Postyshev's agents in central positions of Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov alone. Finally, 237 Party secretaries of th peripheral administrations, 249 chairman of the executive committees and 158 chairmen of the controlling commissions, as well as 1300 members of the Association of Communist Socialist Youth (Komsomol) were victims of this purge. (66) The

66. Report of Pstyshev at the Party meeting in Khar'kov in November 1933.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
●665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./*/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/*/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

*[For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, Category 116 - Analyst]

177 197 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary proceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

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665 883 867 857 Young people are supposed to spend their leisure time in the Party organizations of the "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

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71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
conversations "about the difficult life of child-
857 ren in capitalist countries, about the internat-
ional youth movement and the forthcoming meeting
of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on"
at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72) what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profession of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

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72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

876 of a machine and who, like a machine, heedless of personal concerns, unencumbered by spiritual impulses will produce the maximum number of revolutions for as long a time as possible. Only when the entire production of the educational factories is standardized does the individual product adapt itself without friction to the process. If the education of children were left to the families as it was before, the entire experiment would be jeopardized from the beginning, the more so since the Soviet Union is still primarily an agrarian country. For this reason the Bolsheviks replace the irreplacable educational force of the family with children's and young people's homes. This has its advantages: family ties are loosened and finally severed, the poison of Ukrainian nationalism is staved off and God is eliminated.

Thus young people are reared, homines technici who "perform their tasks purely automatically like machines, devoid of any moments of emotion, detached from any family ties and from ethnic groups, free from religious prejudice, merely on the basis of a rationally determined plan. But the machine is cruel; it destroys and crushes everything that stands in its way, for it knows no feelings, no former merits, it does not perceive individual greatness. Everything that towers above the measuring rod of the official pattern is mowed down, has its head cut off".(77)

77. Richthofen: Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 76.

000 /Facing page 128/ /A typical workers' settlement near Krivoy Rog. Everywhere around the industrial cities which have sprung up like mushrooms, such loam huts are built as workers' cottages./1/Facing page 129/ /Richelieu Terrace in Odessa/1/129/

665
883
876 The head of the Komsomol, Kosarev, was justified in making the following statement at the

1 [For plates, cf. pp 222-223, category 116 — Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.* The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students
[681] into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/

In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

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78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

* [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and Methods, cf. pp 133-135, category NG - Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

UKRAINE RD1

186 517 For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

186 665 ● The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism.[1] The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.[5] The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 129-130, 21: Kolarz --Analyst]

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665 its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186 bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661 Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665 assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186 period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177] political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668 of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661 it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814] towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 130-131 --Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p.128 -- Analyst]

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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563] against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
661 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
●665 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged
668 in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

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Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'. S.U. 635 186 UK 661 668 665

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border. SU. 648 563

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8] S.U. [361]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland.[2] This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers. S.U. [728] [635]

[1] [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov Union, Analyst]

[2] [Cf. category 116, pp 136 ff -- Analyst]

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There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

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The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

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affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones. S.U. 563

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R. UK. 728

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians. UK. 665

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation. UK. 668

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms